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Abstract 
Health psychology shows that responses to risk and threat depend on perceptions as much as 
objective factors. The present study focuses on the precursors of perceived threat of COVID-
19. We draw on political and social psychology and use the aversion amplification hypothesis 
to propose that subjective uncertainty and political trust should interactively impact perceived 
threat. We conducted a cross-sectional survey amongst the general population of Scotland (N 
= 188) in the early period of the COVID-19 pandemic in the UK. We hypothesised that high 
political trust should ameliorate the threat-elevating impact of uncertainty, thereby reducing 
perceived threat from high to moderate level. This hypothesis was supported, even after 
accounting for demographic differences. The discussion addresses the implications of the 
interactive role of trust and uncertainty for strategies to manage public behaviour as the 
pandemic progresses.  
 
 Keywords: aversion amplification; COVID-19; perceived threat; political trust; 
uncertainty 
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Introduction 
At the time of writing, the world faces the coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19), an 
event unprecedented in most people’s living memory. The outbreak was first identified in 
China in November/December 2019, from where it rapidly spread to the rest of the world. It 
was officially recognised as a pandemic on 11 March 2020 (World Health Organization, 
2020). As well as scientific research to develop tests, vaccines and treatments, there are also 
important tasks for psychological science, for example by anticipating and measuring 
individuals’ emotional and cognitive response to this unforeseen event. The present research 
investigated personal and societal factors influencing the extent to which people perceive the 
pandemic as threatening. Specifically, we tested the interactive effect of subjective 
uncertainty and political trust on perceived level of threat. From prior research and theory, we 
contend that a moderate rather than high level of threat is likely to be most adaptive as it 
facilitates a sense of coping and the adoption of health protection behaviour whilst avoiding 
excessive reaction. Specifically, we hypothesised that perceived uncertainty should be 
associated with increased level of threat but that this relationship should weaken when 
political trust is high. We now consider these variables in turn.  
Perceived threat 
 Perceived threat is defined as the set of cognitions or thoughts a person has about a 
danger or harm that exists in the environment (Witte, 1994), for themselves or for others. The 
consequences of perceived individual threat have been extensively studied in health 
psychology, notably in the framework of fear appeals (e.g., Witte & Allen, 2000), where 
evidence indicates that perception of high threat may promote adoption of protective health 
behaviour, but only if accompanied with high efficacy (Peters et al., 2013; see Ruiter et al., 
2014, for a review). Otherwise, high threat is more likely to trigger fear control mechanisms 
(Witte & Allen, 2000) whereby people focus on coping with their fear rather than with the 
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source of the threat. Thus, high threat is liable to stimulate reactance, denial, defensive 
avoidance of the threat, and lack of behaviour change (Witte, 1994). Other evidence indicates 
that threatening information may increase panic reactions during a painful occurrence, 
reducing coping strategies, and ultimately decreasing pain tolerance (Jackson et al., 2005). 
Similar findings emerge in the specific context of pandemics, and authors have reported how 
fear-driven behaviour could hinder public health efforts (e.g., with people avoiding to seek 
healthcare out of fear of being exposed to the virus in hospitals and therefore ultimately 
accelerating transmission; O’Leary et al., 2018). At the other extreme, low perceived threat 
may also be ineffective because it does not trigger any motivation to change one’s behaviour 
(Harris & Napper, 2005; Witte, 1994). 
 Perceived threat may be conceptualised both at the group and individual levels. In 
social psychological research, the focus is often on perceived threat for the entire group to 
which the individual belongs (e.g., Stephan et al., 2009). In the present research, we focus on 
individuals’ perceived threat concerning the (national) group. This is because data were 
collected during the very early stage of the pandemic, when individuals’ personal exposure to 
the virus was still very low and their behaviour could have been influenced by the 
implications of virus for the group as a whole. Importantly, however, individual threat and 
group threat often align with each other, at least to an extent (Rosenstein, 2008), because 
individuals tend to project their own views and experiences on to their entire group (e.g., 
Wojcieszak & Price, 2009) or assimilate their sense of self to the group prototype (e.g., Hogg 
& Abrams, 1988). 
 In addition, research on group-level threat distinguished between ‘realistic’ threat 
(tangible risk for the group’s physical or material conditions) and ‘symbolic’ threat (risk for 
the group’s values, identity, and way of life; Stephan et al., 2009; Stephan & Stephan, 2017). 
Although public health issues are primarily conceptualised as a form of realistic threat, there 
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is evidence that they also constitute symbolic threat if they potentially disrupt people’s way of 
life and social interactions (see Kachanoff et al., 2020). Thus, in the context of the COVID-19 
outbreak, it is important to consider both realistic and symbolic forms of threat. 
In summary, we propose that, psychologically, a moderate to high level of perceived 
threat of COVID-19 is likely to be more optimal than a very high or extreme level, because 
more moderate levels should enhance a sense of coping and encourage the adoption of 
protective health behaviour (e.g., frequent hand-washing, respecting social distancing) while 
avoiding panic behaviour and denial/reactance reactions. We next discuss how uncertainty 
and political trust could together determine the level of perceived threat. 
Uncertainty 
 Uncertainty has been defined as the “subjective experience of ignorance. It is a higher-
order metacognition representing a particular kind of explicit knowledge—an 
acknowledgment of what one does not know, but also that one does not know” (Anderson et 
al., 2019, p. 2). There is a strong agreement in psychology as well as behavioural economics 
that humans are generally aversive to uncertainty (Al-Najjar & Weinstein, 2009; Carleton, 
2016b; Zeckhauser, 2006), notwithstanding some cross-cultural (Hofstede, 2011) and 
interindividual variations (Sorrentino et al., 1988). Generally, individuals favour less 
uncertain choices and are ready to pay to reduce uncertainty (Lovallo & Kahneman, 2000). 
‘Fear of the unknown’ has moreover been described as one of the most fundamental fear 
(Carleton, 2016a; see also Pyszczynski et al., 2010; Pyszczynski et al., 2015). 
Consequentially, potentially negative events whose outcomes are also highly unpredictable 
elicit strong negative responses and increase a sense of threat. For example, Slovic (1987) 
illustrated how events with high catastrophic potential (or dread risk; i.e., low-probability, 
high-consequence) are evaluated as more threatening than less catastrophic events even if the 
latter lead to higher annual fatalities (see also Gigerenzer, 2004). Interestingly, simulation 
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data show that this stronger aversion of dread risk might be an ecologically rational reaction 
when majority of fatalities will be young people, but not when fatalities will mostly be older 
people (as is the case in the COVID-19 pandemic; Bodemer et al., 2013). It is worth noting 
that findings seem to apply both to personal uncertainty (as is more studied in behavioural 
economics) and group uncertainty (as reflected by reactions to dread risks, which represent a 
risk to one’s entire group, nation, etc.). It follows that the uncertainty linked to the outcomes 
of a dread risk posed by the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to have at least as strong, and 
probably a stronger impact on people as uncertainty linked to continuous risks (such as 
diabetes, cancer, or household accidents). Therefore, we expect to observe that those who feel 
greater uncertainty of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic (for the self and for one’s 
group) are likely to perceive a greater level of threat. The strength of this relationship might, 
however, depend on political trust.  
Political trust 
 In general terms, political trust refers to the faith people have in their government 
(Levi & Stoker, 2000). It hence represents a form of diffuse support for the authorities 
(Easton, 1975). Political trust has been found to predict different outcomes, for example 
increasing institutionalised participation (voting, etc.; Hooghe & Marien, 2013), decreasing 
non-institutionalised participation (demonstrating, boycotting, etc.; Kaase, 1999), and 
increasing compliance with governmental demands and regulations (Levi & Stoker, 2000). 
There is also evidence that political trust influences citizens’ perception of global or social 
events as more or less threatening. Early on, Short (1984) proposed that risk perception was 
subject to social factors, and that the influence of “respected public officials” might downplay 
certain threats. More recently, Abrams and Travaglino (2018) showed that political trust 
decreased perceived threat from immigration amongst a representative sample of Scottish and 
English people. Specifically, they found low levels of trust to amplify perceived threat, in 
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interaction with people’s concern about the situation, a process they defined as ‘aversion 
amplification’.  
 Given the nature of the COVID-19 outbreak, we believe political trust is a key factor 
to take into account (Travaglino & Moon; 2020). The pandemic has quickly become a highly 
politicised issue because of its global nature and the need for a clear national (if not 
international) stance. People have depended on government authorities to set parameters for 
what they can or should do, for valid information, and confirmation of social reality. In turn, 
governments have been quick to issue (sometimes imperfect) recommendations and decrees to 
guide their citizens’ behaviour. Hence, we expect a negative relationship between political 
trust and perceived threat, so that more trusting individuals would perceive the outbreak as 
less threatening for their national group. Moreover, based on Abrams and Travaglino’s (2018) 
aversion amplification hypothesis, we expect trust to moderate the impact of uncertainty. 
However, whereas Abrams and Travaglino (2018) examined how lower trust amplifies threat, 
the present research tests the flip side of the hypothesis: when individuals perceive a high 
level of uncertainty over the situation of their country, their perceptions of threat should be 
ameliorated to the extent that they have greater trust that their government will take adequate 
measures and cope optimally with situation. In other words, higher trust should ameliorate the 
impact of uncertainty. 
The Present Study 
This cross-sectional study tested the hypothesised interactive impact of political trust 
and uncertainty on perceived threat of the COVID-19 outbreak. Data were collected between 
5th and 10th March 2020, at the time when reports identified the first deaths linked to the virus 
in the UK. Between these dates the number of cases in the UK rose from 90 to 373 (6 to 23 in 
Scotland specifically), and the number of confirmed deaths rose from 1 to 6 (none in 
Scotland). In the same time window, China had confirmed more than 80,000 cases (and 
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approximately 4,000 deaths) and in Europe Italy went from 3,900 to 9,000 cases (150 to 1,800 
deaths). Right afterwards (11 March) the World Health Organisation declared COVID-19 
outbreak a pandemic (World Health Organization, 2020). Hence, even though most people in 
Scotland had yet to be directly affected, they were aware of the potential of the outbreak. 
Participants completed an online questionnaire. They first reported demographics, then 
indicated how (un)certain they were about the current situation, and how much they 
(dis)trusted their politicians. Finally, they reported their perceptions of threat from the 
outbreak. Data is publicly available on the OSF repository of the project: https://osf.io/pwf9e.  
Method 
 Participants 
 Participants were Scottish residents recruited as part of a larger national survey with 
the help of an external partner, Qualtrics Panels. A subsample of 188 participants answered 
questions related to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic which are the focus on the present 
paper. There were 76 men and 112 women aged 18 to 80 (M = 55.9, SD = 13.7) from all 
regions of Scotland. A sensitivity power analysis indicated that the sample size would allow 
detecting a small-to-medium interaction effect (Cohen’s d = 0.41) at 80% power (α = .05, 
G*Power; Faul et al., 2007). 
 We measured and controlled for the following demographics: education level (coded 1 
to 5, a higher score representing higher education degree), SES status (continuous composite 
score of three measures: number of books owned, numbers of vehicles owned, whether they 
own or rent their home, ranging from 0 to 1; see Table 1), and subjective socioeconomic 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations between uncertainty, political trust, and 
threat, and main demographics. 
   Pearson’s correlation 
  M (SD) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Uncertainty 3.08 (1.06) -.06 .14† -.03 -.10 .02 -.01 -.06 
2 Political trust 2.46 (0.84)  -.19** -.05 .19** .18* .23** .16* 
3 Perceived threat 3.87 (0.82)   .13 -.02 .00 -.11 .02 
4 Gender  -    -.24** -.13 -.14† -.06 
5 Age 55.9 (13.7)     .16* .34*** .02 
6 SES status  0.60 (0.25)      .46*** .36*** 
7 Subjective status 4.28 (1.40)       .24** 
8 Education level 2.85 (1.33)        
Notes. Uncertainty, trust, and threat were measured on 5-point scale. SES status ranges from 
0-1, education level from 1-5, and subjective status was measured on an 8-point scale (‘status 
ladder’). Gender: -1 = male, +1 = female.  
† p = .060, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Measures 
 Uncertainty. Uncertainty was measured with a single item: “How unsure or sure do 
you feel about how the coronavirus will affect people in Scotland?” (1 = Extremely sure, 5 = 
Extremely unsure). This item and all the following were measured on a 5-point scale; 
descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. 
 Political trust. Five items assessed political trust (e.g., “Most members of the UK 
parliament are honest”, “Politicians are mainly in politics for their own benefit and not for the 
benefit of the community” (recoded); 1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree) and were 
averaged (α = .74). 
 Perception of threat. Because the COVID-19 outbreak and its consequences are 
likely to interfere with various domains of life (see Kachanoff et al., 2020), and in line with 
previous work in social psychology on the assessment of perceived threat (Abrams & 
Houston, 2006; Abrams & Travaglino, 2018), we measured perception of threat with two 
items: “To what extent do you think that the general way of life is becoming worse or better 
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because of the coronavirus outbreak?”, “To what extent do you think that safety, security and 
health are becoming worse or better because of the coronavirus outbreak?” (1 = Much better, 
5 = Much worse). Items were strongly correlated (r (186) = .78, p < .001) and averaged in a 
score of perceived threat (Spearman-Brown coefficient = .88). 
Results 
 A three-stage hierarchical multiple regression was conducted with perceived threat as 
the dependent variable. The main effects of uncertainty and political trust (both standardised) 
were entered at stage one; their interaction was entered at stage two. Finally, gender (-1 = 
male, 1 = female), age, subjective and observed SES, and level of education (all standardised) 
were entered at stage three to ensure that any effect identified held when controlling for 
demographics. Results are reported in Table 2. Of all demographics, only gender had a 
significant effect: Women (M = 3.95, SD = .86) reported higher perceived threat than men (M 
= 3.69, SD = .72). The analysis yielded a significant main effect of political trust that held 
through stages 1 to 3: Perceived threat decreased when political trust increased. There was no 
main effect of uncertainty. More importantly, the expected political trust × uncertainty 
interaction was significant, regardless of whether demographics were included in the model 
(see Figure 1). 
Decompositions of simple effects revealed that, amongst participants with lower 
political trust (-1 SD), uncertainty was associated with increased perception of threat, b = .21, 
SE = .07, t(184) = 3.00, p = .003, d = 0.44, 95% CI [0.15, 0.74]. However, political trust 
ameliorated the impact of uncertainty: participants with higher political trust (+1 SD) reported 
a similar perceived threat regardless of their level of uncertainty, b = -.08, SE = .09, t(184) = -
0.87, p = .39, d = -0.13, 95% CI [-0.42, 0.16]. Put differently, amongst participants with 
higher uncertainty (+1 SD), greater political trust was associated with significantly lower 
perceptions of threat, b = -.32, SE = .09, t(184) = -3.70, p < .001, d = -0.54, 95% CI [-0.84, -
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0.25], which was not the case amongst participants with lower uncertainty (-1 SD), b = -.03, 
SE = .07, t(184) = -0.47, p = .64, d = -0.07, 95% CI [-0.36, 0.22]. 
 
Figure 1. Perceived threat of the COVID-19 outbreak as a function of political trust and 
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Table 2. Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for variables predicting perceived threat. 
 Step 1  Step 2  Step 3 
Variable b (SE) β t-test p-value  b (SE) β t-test p-value  b (SE) β t-test p-value 
Intercept 3.87 (.06)  65.7 < .001  3.86 (.06)  66.4 < .001  3.81 (.06)  63.6 < .001 
Uncertainty .10 (.06) .13 1.76 .080  .07 (.06) .08 1.13 .26  .12 (.06) .14 1.91 .057 
Political trust -.15 (.06) -.18 -2.53 .012  -.18 (.06) -.22 -3.09 .002  -.16 (.06) -.20 -2.62 .010 
Uncertainty × Trust      -.15 (.06) -.20 -2.67 .008  -.15 (.06) -.20 -2.68 .008 
Gender           .13 (.06) .16 2.10 .038 
Age           .05 (.07) .06 0.77 .44 
SES status           .06 (.07) .08 0.94 .35 
Subjective status           -.10 (.07) -.12 -1.38 .17 
Education level           .05 (.06) .06 0.75 .46 
 Step 1: F(2, 185) = 5.05, p = .007, R2 = .052, R2adj = .041 
Step 2: F(3, 184) = 5.84, p = .001, R2 = .087, ΔR2 = .035, R2adj = .072 
Step 3: F(8, 168) = 3.35, p = .001, R2 = .138, ΔR2 = .051, R2adj = .097 
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Discussion 
The present study investigated perceptions of threat from the COVID-19 pandemic in 
the early days of the outbreak in the UK. In line with the aversion amplification hypothesis 
and with previous findings in political and social psychology, we found that the combination 
of uncertainty regarding the group’s situation and political trust predicted perceived threat for 
the group. Specifically, high political trust ameliorated the impact of uncertainty, leading to a 
more moderate perception of threat.  
Importantly, even the most ‘prepared’ participants (those reporting low uncertainty 
and high political trust) did not report low but rather moderate levels of perceived threat 
(slightly above the scale mid-point). With respect to our initial reasoning, this level of threat 
seems likely to be the optimal response to the situation, since it should facilitate healthy 
coping and behaviour change without triggering panic responses nor fear control mechanisms 
(such as denial or reactance; see Witte, 1994). This response should be beneficial both at the 
individual and the group level, given the need for a coordinated response from all people in 
order to tackle the pandemic effectively (O’Leary et al., 2018).  
It is also important that these effects held when taking demographics into account, 
highlighting the need to incorporate individuals’ perspectives and not just their demographic 
context when addressing perceptions of threat from the pandemic. People’s age, level of 
education, and SES status were all positively related to political trust but those factors are not 
directly amenable to influence. Moreover, it was their psychological mediation through trust 
that accounted for levels of threat and which seems most proximally relevant and amenable to 
influence. 
The present research makes several contributions. First, data were collected early in 
the course of the pandemic in the UK, when we were able to capture citizens’ representations 
of the pandemic before they had been directly affected. Thus, the evidence anticipates why 
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people may subsequently have responded more or less appropriately to the actual level of 
threat. Second, this work combines insights from the different fields of health psychology, 
political psychology, and social psychology to propose a distinctive account of perceived 
threat as a function of the wider social environment. The findings notably extend previous 
research in political psychology by showing a novel impact of political trust that has seldom 
been explored in the domain of health. Most importantly, the evidence has immediate 
relevance to people’s lives and actions at a time when it matters.  
Some limitations must also be recognized. First, the cross-sectional design of the study 
limits a causal interpretation of the results. Experimentally manipulating the variables would 
be beneficial to ascertain claims of causality. However, in the present context, experimental 
manipulation of trust or uncertainty might be ethically questionable. We believe the value of 
the evidence lies in the insight it provides into how individuals’ subjective perception of trust 
and uncertainty are likely to be implicated in their sense of threat. Managing this threat is 
clearly relevant to ensuring that behavioural responses are adaptive and appropriate rather 
than dysfunctional or disruptive. Threat is a particularly important variable because it is 
known to affect a series of different outcomes such as people’s sense of coping, their adoption 
of protective behaviour, panic reactions, reactance or denial (Peters et al., 2013; Witte & 
Allen, 2000). It will be useful if future studies test this causal chain more extensively, 
particularly whether uncertainty and trust impact other psychological and behavioural 
outcomes through perceived threat. Different types of threat should also be investigated as 
recent evidence suggest that symbolic and realistic threat are differently related to health 
protection behaviour (Kachanoff et al., 2020). Individual threat and group threat could also 
impact people’s behaviour differently (e.g., whether they prioritise personal protection or 
interpersonal helping, versus distancing from outgroups or volunteering and help groups 
perceived to be more at risk).  
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In summary, the present results offer insight into factors that drive perceptions of 
extreme threat, and which might be open to influence to ensure threat levels are adaptive. One 
avenue is to optimise the population’s level of uncertainty, while another is to increase their 
political trust. Another, which might be better suited to local contexts, is to calibrate the 
balance between these differently for different individuals and locales to ensure that 
behaviour is appropriate for their immediate or local situation. Political trust tends to build or 
decline gradually, but this may not be the case in times of crisis such as the present pandemic. 
An opinion survey conducted in Italy during the first half of March 2020 (when the entire 
country went into lockdown) revealed that trust in the authorities was much higher than it had 
been a few months before the outbreak started (Falcone et al., 2020). Hence, it seems that 
trust may also react directly to how adequate governmental responses to the crisis are 
perceived to be. Importantly, it can decline just as quickly if the governmental responses are 
perceived as ineffective, e.g. as the death rate rose dramatically.  
We believe the most direct implications of this research concern communication 
strategies (see Kronick, 2020) and involve both the media and official entities. Governments 
are likely to inspire higher trust by communicating a clear and sensible action plan and 
globally conveying an impression of competence, motivation, and legitimacy. In addition, it is 
important to provide –as far as possible– clear information or projection of the individual and 
collective level impact of the social, economic and medical aspects of the course of the 
pandemic. This might best be achieved if medical and social science advisors, governments 




TRUST, UNCERTAINTY, AND COVID-19 THREAT  16 
References 




Abrams, D., & Travaglino, G. A. (2018). Immigration, political trust, and Brexit - Testing an aversion 
amplification hypothesis. British Journal of Social Psychology, 57(2), 310-326. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/bjso.12233  
Al-Najjar, N. I., & Weinstein, J. (2009). The ambiguity aversion literature: A critical assessment. 
Economics and Philosophy, 25(3), 249-284. https://doi.org/10.1017/S026626710999023X  
Anderson, E. C., Carleton, R. N., Diefenbach, M., & Han, P. K. J. (2019). The relationship between 
uncertainty and affect. Frontiers in Psychology, 10(2504). 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02504  
Bodemer, N., Ruggeri, A., & Galesic, M. (2013). When dread risks are more dreadful than continuous 
risks: Comparing cumulative population losses over time. PLoS ONE, 8(6), e66544. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0066544  
Carleton, R. N. (2016a). Fear of the unknown: One fear to rule them all? Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 
41, 5-21. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.janxdis.2016.03.011  
Carleton, R. N. (2016b). Into the unknown: A review and synthesis of contemporary models involving 
uncertainty. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 39, 30-43. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.janxdis.2016.02.007  
Easton, D. (1975). A re-assessment of the concept of political support. British Journal of Political 
Science, 5(4), 435-457. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123400008309  
Falcone, R., Castelfranchi, C., & Colì, E. (2020). Coronavirus e fiducia - Una ricerca esplorativa. 
Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche. 
https://www.cnr.it/sites/default/files/public/media/rassegna_stampa/cnr%20istc_nota_coronavi
rus%20e%20fiducia_una%20ricerca%20esplorativa-2.pdf  
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A.-G., & Buchner, A. (2007). G*Power 3: A flexible statistical power 
analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences. Behavior Research 
Methods, 39, 175-191. https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03193146  
Gigerenzer, G. (2004). Dread risk, September 11, and fatal traffic accidents. Psychological Science, 
15(4), 286-287. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00668.x  
TRUST, UNCERTAINTY, AND COVID-19 THREAT  17 
Harris, P. R., & Napper, L. (2005). Self-affirmation and the biased processing of threatening health-
risk information. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31(9), 1250-1263. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167205274694  
Hofstede, G. (2011). Dimensionalizing cultures: The Hofstede model in context. Online Readings in 
Psychology and Culture, 2(1), 1-26. https://doi.org/10.9707/2307-0919.1014  
Hogg, M. A., & Abrams, D. (1988). Social identifications: A social psychology of intergroup relations 
and group processes. London, UK: Routledge. 
Hooghe, M., & Marien, S. (2013). A comparative analysis of the relation between political trust and 
forms of political participation in Europe. European Societies, 15(1), 131-152. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2012.692807  
Jackson, T., Pope, L., Nagasaka, T., Fritch, A., Iezzi, T., & Chen, H. (2005). The impact of threatening 
information about pain on coping and pain tolerance. British Journal of Health Psychology, 
10(3), 441-451. https://doi.org/10.1348/135910705x27587  
Kaase, M. (1999). Interpersonal trust, political trust and non‐institutionalised political participation in 
Western Europe. West European Politics, 22(3), 1-21. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01402389908425313  
Kachanoff, F., Bigman, Y. E., Kapsaskis, K., & Gray, K. (2020). Measuring realistic and symbolic 
threats of COVID-19 and their unique impacts on well-being and adherence to public health 
behaviors. Social Psychological and Personality Science, OnlineFirst, 1-14. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550620931634  
Kronick, S. (2020). COVID-19: How to communicate in turbulent times 
https://www.ogilvy.com/uploads/O200316_Paper_COVID(1).pdf  
Levi, M., & Stoker, L. (2000). Political trust and trustworthiness. Annual Review of Political Science, 
3(1), 475-507. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.3.1.475  
Lovallo, D., & Kahneman, D. (2000). Living with uncertainty: attractiveness and resolution timing. 
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 13(2), 179-190. https://doi.org/10.1002/(sici)1099-
0771(200004/06)13:2<179::Aid-bdm332>3.0.Co;2-j  
O'Leary, A., Jalloh, M. F., & Neria, Y. (2018). Fear and culture: contextualising mental health impact 
of the 2014-2016 Ebola epidemic in West Africa. BMJ Global Health, 3(3), e000924-
e000924. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmjgh-2018-000924  
Peters, G.-J. Y., Ruiter, R. A. C., & Kok, G. (2013). Threatening communication: a critical re-analysis 
and a revised meta-analytic test of fear appeal theory. Health Psychology Review, 7(sup1), S8-
S31. https://doi.org/10.1080/17437199.2012.703527  
TRUST, UNCERTAINTY, AND COVID-19 THREAT  18 
Pyszczynski, T., Greenberg, J., Koole, S., & Solomon, S. (2010). Experimental existential psychology: 
Coping with the facts of life. In Handbook of social psychology, Vol. 1, 5th ed. (pp. 724-757). 
John Wiley & Sons Inc. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470561119.socpsy001020  
Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., & Greenberg, J. (2015). Chapter one - Thirty years of Terror 
Management Theory: From genesis to revelation. In J. M. Olson & M. P. Zanna (Eds.), 
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 52, pp. 1-70). Academic Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.aesp.2015.03.001  
Rosenstein, J. E. (2008). Individual threat, group threat, and racial policy: Exploring the relationship 
between threat and racial attitudes. Social Science Research, 37(4), 1130-1146. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2008.04.001  
Ruiter, R. A. C., Kessels, L. T. E., Peters, G.-J. Y., & Kok, G. (2014). Sixty years of fear appeal 
research: current state of the evidence. International Journal of Psychology, 49(2), 63-70. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/ijop.12042  
Short, J. F. J. (1984). The social fabric at risk: Toward a social transformation of risk analysis. 
American Sociological Review, 49(6), 711-725. https://doi.org/10.2307/2095526  
Slovic, P. (1987). Perception of risk. Science, 236(4799), 280-285. 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.3563507  
Sorrentino, R. M., Bobocel, D. R., Gitta, M. Z., Olson, J. M., & Hewitt, E. C. (1988). Uncertainty 
orientation and persuasion: Individual differences in the effects of personal relevance on social 
judgments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55(3), 357-371. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.55.3.357  
Stephan, W. G., & Stephan, C. W. (2017). Intergroup Threat Theory. In Y. Y. Kim (Ed.), The 
International Encyclopedia of Intercultural Communication (pp. 1-12). John Wiley & Sons. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118783665.ieicc0162  
Stephan, W. G., Ybarra, O., & Morrison, K. R. (2009). Intergroup threat theory. In T. D. Nelson (Ed.), 
Handbook of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination. (pp. 43-59). Psychology Press.  




Travaglino, G. A., & Moon, C. (2020). Explaining Compliance with Social Distancing During the 
COVID-19 Pandemic: The Roles of Cultural Orientations, Trust and Self-Conscious Emotions 
in the US, Italy, and South Korea. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/8yn5b  
TRUST, UNCERTAINTY, AND COVID-19 THREAT  19 
Witte, K. (1994). Fear control and danger control: A test of the extended parallel process model 
(EPPM). Communication Monographs, 61(2), 113-134. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/03637759409376328  
Witte, K., & Allen, M. (2000). A meta-analysis of fear appeals: implications for effective public health 
campaigns. Health Education & Behavior, 27(5), 591-615. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/109019810002700506  
Wojcieszak, M., & Price, V. (2009). What underlies the false consensus effect? How personal opinion 
and disagreement affect perception of public opinion. International Journal of Public Opinion 
Research, 21(1), 25-46. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edp001  
World Health Organization. (2020). WHO announces COVID-19 outbreak a pandemic. Retrieved 
12/03/2020 from http://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/health-emergencies/coronavirus-
covid-19/news/news/2020/3/who-announces-covid-19-outbreak-a-pandemic  
Zeckhauser, R. J. (2006). Investing in the unknown and unknowable. Capitalism and Society, 1(2), 1-
41. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.832635  
 
